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A Political-Economy Perspective on Mayoral Elections and 
Urban Crime  
Abstract 
 We provide a political-economy analysis of crime prevention in an arbitrary city in the 
United States. City residents (voters) elect mayors (politicians) and elected mayors determine the 
resources to be allocated to crime prevention. Between the two time periods, there is an election. 
Politicians are either honest or dishonest. The marginal cost of public monies  measures how 
efficiently an elected mayor converts tax receipts into crime prevention. Voters have identical per 
period utility functions. We ascertain the equilibrium outcome and per period voter well-being. 
Second, we show that an increase in  reduces the equilibrium allocation of resources to crime 
prevention and voter well-being. Third, a dishonest politician can delay the revelation of his 
dishonesty. A critical value of , ∗, exists such that a dishonest incumbent separates and loses 
the election if and only if ∗ and he pools and is re-elected otherwise. Finally, we note that 
an increase in  can raise voter well-being when politicians are more likely to be dishonest.  
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 The work of researchers such as Witte (1996) tells us that urban crime is a major issue for 
Americans. Complemeting this point, Rainwater (2019) reminds us that in 2019, “public safety” 
was one of the top ten worries of mayors in cities throughout the United States (US). Because 
urban crime is a serious public policy problem, we can now find a large empirical and case-study 
based literature on this subject. Criminologists in particular and social scientists more generally 
have examined the ways in which a lack of economic opportunities, social disorganization, 
poverty, and the presence of unsupervised youth contribute to the presence and prevalence of urban 
crime.4  
 Politics and politicians in the form of mayors clearly affect the ways in which the problem 
of city crime is understood and dealt with (Dunn, 2020). This notwithstanding, Marion and Oliver 
(2013) rightly point out that it simply does not make sense to only blame mayors for the prevalence 
of urban crime. What actually matters for crime prevention, says Asher (2020), are the policies 
adopted by a mayor and not his or her party affiliation. Given the clear connection between politics, 
politicians, i.e., mayors, and the efficacy of alternate crime prevention policies, it is pertinent to 
ask what economists and regional scientists have written about the nexuses between the behavior 
of city residents who vote to select their mayor and the urban crime fighting policies that are put 
in place by the elected mayor. Therefore, we now briefly discuss this literature and then proceed 
to the main questions that we study in our paper.  
                                                          
4  
See Ward (1976), Lynch (1981), Kohfeld and Sprague (1988), Hale (1996), White (1996), Gibbons (2004), Kourtit (2019), 
Lehmann (2019), and the many references cited in these sources for more on this and related issues.  
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1.2. Literature review 
 Sharp (2006) examines the reasons for the disparity in the size of contemporay police forces 
in large cities in the US. Her detailed empirical analysis shows that the size differences in question 
can be explained by the legacy of the racial unrest during 1960-1970, racial disorders in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and by the prevalence of racial minorities in the current population. Does a mayor’s 
party affiliation influence urban crime rates? Using regression discontinuity design analysis, 
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) demonstrate that whether a mayor is a Democrat or a Republican has 
no bearing on either crime rates or on the allocation of local public spending in large US cities.  
 Does a mayor’s gender have an impact on crime rates in a city? In their study of this 
question, Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) first point out that women’s participation in mayoral 
elections in the US increased from negligible numbers in 1970 to approximately one-third in the 
2000s. Then, employing a regression discontinuity design, they point out that a mayor’s gender 
has no bearing on city crime rates. Interestingly, this negative result holds in the short and in the 
long run. Thompson (2017) analyzes how two different fiscal stress labeling systems for municipal 
governments affect their functioning in Ohio. His econometric analysis shows that the actual label 
used to delineate a municipality has a minimal impact on both crime rates and on the employment 
of police. 
 Heberlig et al. (2017) utilize data for 104 cities during 1992 to 2012 and show that a 
reduction in the crime rate increases the likelihood that an incumbent mayor will seek another term 
in office. In addition and in contrast with the other mayoral accomplishments they study, a 
reduction in the crime rate seems to help mayors win re-election. Wiig (2018) describes how a 
citywide, multi-instrument surveillance network was used to complement the technologically 
mediated community policing in Camden, New Jersey. He points out that even though the success 
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of this surveillance-driven community policing strategy in reducing crime was mixed, the strategy 
did succeed in providing Camden with a positive “ready for business” image. 
 Concentrating on Brazil, Ingram and da Costa (2019) study how the party identification of 
mayors, the partisan alignment of mayors and governors, electoral competition, and voter 
participation affect homicide rates. Geographically weighted regression analysis shows that the 
above four explanatory variables have dissimilar impacts on homicide rates across Brazil’s 5562 
municipalities. Finally, Batabyal et al. (2020) study the centralized versus decentralized provision 
of a controversial crime-fighting technology such as facial recognition software to the police in 
American cities. They show that there are circumstances in which the technology is provided with 
majority voting in a city even though it is inefficient to do so and that it is efficient to provide the 
technology in a city but majority voting will lead to this technology not being provided.  
 Our review of the literature leads to the following noteworthy conclusion. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are no theoretical political-economy studies that have analyzed the 
connections between the voting behavior of the residents of a particular city, the election of a 
mayor in this city, and the prevalence of crime in this same city.  
1.3. Objectives  
 Given this lacuna in the literature, we adapt the analysis in Batabyal and Beladi (2020) and 
provide the first formal, political-economy analysis of urban crime that arises from the interaction 
between city residents (voters) and mayors (politicians) who promise to devote resources to the 
prevention of crime. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  
 Section 2 describes the two-period, political-economy model of crime prevention in an 
arbitrary city in the United States. In this model, city residents or voters elect mayors or politicians 
to office in each time period and elected mayors decide the extent of the resources to devote to 
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crime prevention. Between the two time periods, there is an election. Politicians are either honest 
which means that they are genuinely interested and hence efficient in disbursing resources to fight 
crime or dishonest which means that they are less interested and thus inefficient in disbursing 
resources to combat crime. The marginal cost of public monies 1 measures how efficiently 
elected mayors convert tax receipts into crime prevention. All voters have identical per period 
utility functions. Section 3 computes the equilibrium outcome and per period voter well-being. 
Section 4 demonstrates that an increase in  reduces the equilibrium prevention of crime and voter 
well-being. Section 5 permits a dishonest politician to borrow money and thereby delay the 
revelation of his inefficiency. In this setting, a dishonest politician may seem to be honest and this 
influences his chance of getting elected mayor. This section solves for the equilibrium outcome 
and then demonstrates that there exists a critical value of , ∗,  with the property that the 
dishonest incumbent separates and loses the election if and only if ∗ and that he pools and 
is re-elected mayor otherwise. Section 6 points out that an increase in  can raise voter well-being 
when politicians are more likely to be dishonest. Section 7 concludes and then suggests three ways 
in which the research described in this paper might be extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework  
 Consider the interaction between residents and politicians seeking to be the mayor of an 
arbitrary city in the United States. There are two time periods in our model.5 Between the first and 
the second time period, there is an election to determine which politician will be elected mayor in 
the second period. Politicians differ in terms of how honest they are in genuinely wanting to reduce 
                                                          
5  
Time is discrete and not continuous in our model.  
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crime in the city under study.6 These politicians also differ in terms of the efficiency with which 
they are able to convert tax revenues into actual crime prevention. Voters are uncertain about the 
honesty of the politicians seeking to be elected mayor. Put differently, they are uncertain about 
how efficient politcians are in reducing crime in the city under study.7 
We suppose that politicians are honest with probability 0 and that they are dishonest 
with complementary probability 1 0. We assume that an honest politician is also efficient 
in disbursing resources to fight crime and that a dishonest politician is relatively inefficient in 
disbursing resources to combat crime in the city under consideration.8 We model this efficiency 
aspect of the story by supposing that an honest or efficient politician disburses resources to fight 
and thereby reduce crime at low cost. Similarly, a dishonest or inefficient politician distributes 
resources to combat and therefore lower crime at high cost. In symbols, an honest politician 
disburses resources for crime reduction at unit cost 0, a dishonest politician distributes 
resources for lowering crime at unit cost , and we have . 9 
All residents (voters) of the city under study have an identical per period quasi-linear utility 
function10 and this function is given by  
                                                          
6  
Honesty is viewed as a binary and not as a continuous variable in our model.  
7  
Go to https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2021/04/21/exclusive--covid-19--crime-at-top-of-voters--minds-in-ny1-ipsos-
poll for empirical evidence that voters in New York City care greatly about crime in the upcoming mayoral primaries in June 2021. 
Go to https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/509185-majority-say-they-are-concerned-about-rising-crime-in-us-cities-poll for 
poll evidence that voters are generally concerned about crime in U.S. cities. Both sites accessed on 7 June 2021.  
8  
Following Sharp (2006) and for concreteness, we shall think of “disbursing resources” as being akin to contributing to the size of 
the city police force. So, in this way of looking at the issue, increasing (decreasing) the disbursement of resources is equivalent to 
raising (lowering) the size of the city police force. It is understood that all else being equal, a larger police force is likely to reduce 
crime by more than a smaller police force.  
9  
Go to https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/sadiq-khan-delivers-major-speech-on-violence for additional details on 
how honesty matters in the context of fighting crime in a prominent city outside the US, namely, London. Accessed on 7 June 2021.  
10  
The quasi-linearity of the utility function means that the marginal utility from the crime index  does not depend on taxes  and, 
similarly, the marginal utility from taxes  is independent of the crime index . This is because the cross-partial derivatives of 
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, ,      (1) 
where the function ∙  is differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave,  denotes a 
crime index,  denotes taxes, and 1 represents the marginal cost of public monies. The 
reader should think of  as a crime index such as the NeighborhoodScout’s crime index which 
ranks crime on a 0-100 scale and where 0 (100) is the least (most) safe that a city can be. The 
specific point to grasp here is that an increase (decrease) in  raises (lowers) a city resident’s 
utility and is therefore desirable (undesirable).11 Because the parameter  can be thought of as a 
measure of the scarcity of public resources in our city, an increase in  means that it is now more 
difficult for politicians to raise tax revenues to increase the size of the police force in our city.12 
Without loss of generality and to keep the subsequent mathematical analysis transparent, we 
suppose that there is no discounting between the two time periods. Finally, 0 denotes the 
private gain to politicians from being elected mayor in the city under study.13 
 With this description of the theoretical model out of the way, we are now in a position to 
solve for the equilibrium result that arises from the interaction between residents (voters) on the 
one hand and politicians on the other in our city and to then determine the per period well-being 
                                                          
the quasi-linear utility function in equation (1) are equal to zero. As noted in a standard textbook---see Varian (1992, p. 222)---this 
feature makes quasi-liear utility functions very useful for “equilibrium and welfare analysis.” This also explains why the field of 
mechanism design---and our model can be thought of as one kind of mechanism design model---frequently makes use of quasi-
linear utility functions. If we were to replace the quasi-linear utility function with a more general utility function then the way in 
which we proceed with the analysis would not change but it would be harder to interpret the results obtained because, as noted 
above, the cross-partial derivatives of the utility function would no longer be equal to zero.  
11  
Go to https://help.neighborhoodscout.com/support/solutions/articles/25000001997-what-is-the-crime-index- for additional details 
about this index. Accessed on 8 June 2021.  
12  
Go to https://www.brookings.edu/articles/mayors-and-the-fiscal-powers-needed-to-deliver-change-lessons-from-the-united-states/ 
for additional details on the point that tax revenues are needed to fight crime in cities. Accessed on 8 June 2021.  
13  
Go to https://www.pressconnects.com/story/news/local/2017/04/28/mayor-owns-six-properties-city-problem/101036952/ for more 
details on an instance in which the suggestion is that a mayor enjoyed certain private benefits from being in office. Accessed on 8 
June 2021.  
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of the voters.  
3. The Equilibrium Result and Voter Well-Being 
 Let  denote the type of the incumbent mayor in office in our city in time period 1. Then, 
the value of the crime index that arises in this time period is given by the solution to the 
maximization problem .      (2) 
The first-order necessary condition for an interior solution14 to the above problem is given by the 
equation ∗ ,       (3) 
where ∗ is the optimal value of the crime index.15 We know that the  function is strictly 
increasing and strictly concave. From this it follows that the derivative ′  is positive and 
decreasing in . Using this last point, we deduce that  ∗ ≡ ∗ ∗ ≡ ∗ .     (4) 
The inequality in (4) tells us that the value of the crime index when the honest or low cost 
incumbent fights crime by raising the size of the city police force is greater than the value when a 
dishonest or high cost incumbent combats crime by increasing the size of the city police force. Our 
city voters observe the value of the crime index that emerges in the first time period and then they 
                                                          
14  
We focus on an interior solution because that is what is interesting to analyze in our model. In this regard, corner solutions are not 
noteworthy. To see this, let us use the NeighborhoodScout example discussed in section 2 and consider the two possible corner 
solutions involving the crime index . We could either have 100 or 0. If 100 then our city is already as safe as it 
can possibly be and the question of distinguishing between honest and dishonest politicians is irrelevant. Put differently, if 100 in time period 1 then it would make sense to simply re-elect the incumbent mayor. On the other hand if 0 then out city 
is maximally unsafe and the question of distinguishing between the crime fighting abilities of honest and dishonest politicians---
see equation (4)---would, once again, be immaterial. In other words, if 0 in time period 1 then there would be little point in 
continuing with the incumbent mayor.  
15  
Note that because the ∙  function is concave, the second-order sufficieny condition ∙ 0 is satisfied. 
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re-elect the honest incumbent16 and get rid of the dishonest incumbent in which case a new 
incumbent is elected to replace the dishonest incumbent as mayor.  
If a dishonest politician is removed from office then the new incumbent will be honest and 
efficient with probability 0 and dishonest and inefficient with probability 1 0. As 
such, suppose that in the first time period, the incumbent mayor in office is honest. Then, after 
observing the value of the crime index in our city, residents will re-elect this incumbent. In this 
case, an arbitrary city voter’s per period well-being is  ∗ ∗ ,      (5) 
and therefore this person’s total well-being is simply the sum of the two per period expressions 
given in equation (5) or 2 .  
 On the other hand, if the incumbent mayor in the first time period is dishonest and 
inefficient then this incumbent will be removed from office. In this case, an arbitrary city voter’s 
well-being in the first time period is  ∗ ∗ .      (6) 
This same voter’s well-being in the second time period depends on whether the elected mayor turns 
out to be honest (this happens with probability ) or dishonest (this happens with probability 1
). Consequently, this arbitrary city voter’s second period well-being can be expressed as a 
weighted sum and that sum is  ∗ ∗ 1 ∗ ∗ .   (7) 
Hence, in this second case, an arbitrary city voter’s total well-being is given by the sum of the two 
                                                          
16  
Go to https://www.bendbulletin.com/opinion/guest-column-honesty-important-in-mayor-s-race/article_18acc40a-49e5-5118-
ae54-9701b1360e05.html for evidence on the point that honesty is an important trait in mayoral elections. Accessed on 8 June 2021.  
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expressions given in equations (6) and (7) or . We now proceed to show that a rise in the 
marginal cost of public monies or  reduces both the equilibrium value of the crime index and the 
well-being of voters in the city under study.  
4. A Rise in the Marginal Cost of Public Monies 
 Let us begin by totally differentiating the first-order necessary condition for an optimum 
given in equation (3). This gives us ∗ ∗ .       (8) 
We now use the strict concavity of the ∙  function---which means that the second derivative of 
this function is negative or ∙ 0---to obtain an expression that can be signed. That expression 
is  
 
∗ ∗ 0.       (9) 
 
Equation (9) shows that when the marginal cost of public monies or  increases, the equilibrium 
value of the crime index falls. This result arises because an increase in  means that it is now 
more difficult to raise the tax revenues that will be used to increase the size of the city police force 
and thereby reduce crime. 
 To demonstrate the validity of a similar claim for the well-being of voters in the city under 
study, we use a well-known result in microeconomic theory, namely, the envelope theorem.17 
Now, recalling equation (1) and then using the envelope theorem, we get  
                                                          
17  
See Varian (1992, pp. 490-492) for a textbook description of the envelope theorem. 
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∗ ∗ ∗ 0.     (10) 
 
The right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (10) clearly tells us that an increase in the marginal cost of 
public monies or  lowers the well-being of voters in our city in both time periods and for both 
possible types of incumbent politicians (honest or dishonest). This negative finding strengthens the 
previous finding in equation (9) that an increase in  lowers the equilibrium value of the crime 
index ∗. Specifically, since the RHS of equation (10) depends on ∗ which is lower, it follows 
that the well-being of voters in our city is also lower. We now proceed to analyze the case in which 
a dishonest politician is able to hide the fact that he is dishonest by borrowing monies and thereby 
delaying the revelation of his inefficiency to our city voters.  
5. A Dishonest Politician Seeming to be Honest  
 The modeling framework now is basically the same as the framework described in section 
2 but there is one salient difference. Specifically, a dishonest incumbent can delay the revelation 
of his dishonesty and inefficiency by borrowing money denoted by 0. This borrowing is 
observable to our city voters only after the election at the end of the first time period. In addition, 
this borrowing by a dishonest incumbent permits him to appear honest because he can act as if the 
unit cost of raising the crime index or lowering crime is low when it is, in fact, high.18 The reader 
should note that this course of action also results in the creation of a budget deficit in an election 
year.  
 In the first time period, the incumbent mayor observes the unit cost ∈ , . He then 
                                                          
18  
See Janezic and Gallego (2020) for evidence on the point that mayors do lie in actual instances and that in some settings, lying by 
mayors can be a beneficial strategy. Accessed on 8 June 2021.  
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selects the value of the crime index or the amount by which crime is to be reduced  and the 
amount of money  that he would like to borrow. These two actions lead to a total tax bill given 
by . Next, our city voters observe the choices of  and  before the election. On the 
basis of these two observations, voters draw a conclusion about the incumbent mayor’s type. The 
incumbent is re-elected if he is at least as likely to be honest as a rival who is honest with prior 
probability 0 and dishonest with prior probability 1 0. In the second time period, 
the politician then in office again selects  given  and he repays the money  he borrowed in 
the first time period. These two actions give rise to a tax bill denoted by . No 
additional elections take place in our model. 
 There are now two tasks to complete. First, we would like to compute the equilibrium 
outcome that arises in the interaction between our city voters and politicians. Second, we want to 
establish that there exists a critical value of , ∗, with the property that the dishonest incumbent 
separates and loses the election if and only if ∗  and that he pools and is re-elected 
otherwise.19  
 We begin by pointing out that voters do not observe either the incumbent’s type  or the 
money  that he has borrowed before the election. Therefore, in a pooling equilibrium, the 
following equality ∗ ∗       (11) 
                                                          
19  
The game we are analyzing here is a “signaling game” which is one kind of dynamic game of incomplete information. Standard 
equilibria to analyze in signaling games are the “pooling” and “separating” equilibria. Now, as in our present analysis, consider a 
signaling game with two kinds of players, i.e., politicians and voters. In a pooling equilibrium, all types (honest or dishonest) of a 
specific kind of player (in our case politicians) send the same message or signal to the other kind of player (in our case voters). This 
interaction between politicians and voters leads to a pooling equilibrium. In contrast, when the different types of politicians (honest 
or dishonest) send different messages or signals to the voters, the ensuing interaction between politicians and voters leads to a 
separating equilibrium. For more on these ideas, the reader ought to consult a standard game theory text such as Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1991).  
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must hold. An implication of equation (11) is that in order to bewilder voters into thinking that he 
is honest, a dishonest incumbent mayor will borrow ∗       (12) 
in the first time period. Since this borrowed money must be paid back in the second time period, a 
dishonest incumbent will choose to pool and be re-elected mayor if and only if the borrowed 
quantity  is no larger than 2  which is his private gain from being mayor for two time periods. 
In symbols, the inequality that must hold is  2 ∗ .       (13) 
Now, supposing that the expression in (13) holds as an equality, we get  
 
∗ ∗ .       (14) 
 
Using equation (3), we can simplify the expression in equation (14) and, simultaneously, infer the 
critical value of , ∗ that we are looking for. We get  
 
∗ .      (15) 
 
We have already demonstrated in section 4 that the optimal value of the crime index ∗ is 
a decreasing function of the marginal cost of public monies . This last result tells us that when 
 increases, the left-hand-side (LHS) of (13) decreases. This allows us to conclude that for all ∗,  (13) holds as a strict inequality and hence we get a separating equilibrium. In this 
equilibrium, a dishonest incumbent mayor will choose to separate and lose the election at the end 
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of the first time period. In contrast, when ∗, this incumbent mayor will effectively pool and 
be re-elected mayor in the second time period.  
 Before continuing further, let us stress three points about our analysis thus far. First, an 
inefficient incumbent politician’s ability to borrow money  does not ensure that he will be re-
elected mayor in the election after the first time period. The purpose of borrowing  is to bewilder 
voters into thinking that an inefficient mayor is efficient. If voters believe this attempt to bewilder 
them then this makes re-election more likely but not certain for the inefficient incumbent mayor. 
Second, the 2  term on the LHS of (13) makes sense because the per period private gain from 
being elected mayor is the constant  and we are accounting for this private gain over two time 
periods in (13). Finally, in general, there is nothing necessarily untoward about an elected politician 
borrowing money, promising to pay it back in an ensuing time period, and thereby creating a 
budget deficit. This happens and hence we now have a literature on the “political budget cycle.”20 
That said, our final task in this paper is to demonstrate that a rise in  can increase voter well-
being when politicians are more likely to be dishonest. 
6. A Second Rise in the Marginal Cost of Public Monies  
 Upon reflection, it is easy to confirm that in the pooling equilibrium that we have been 
discussing, the well-being of voters differs only in the second time period. Hence, before the 
resolution of uncertainty about  and , voter welfare in the two time periods under study is 
given by  ∗ ∗      (16) 
                                                          
20  




and ∗ ∗ 1 ∗ ∗ ,  (17) 
where ∙  is the expectation operator.  
 To figure out the effect of the marginal cost of public monies  on voter well-being over 
the two time periods in our city, we differentiate the sum  with respect to . This 
gives us 
 1 ∗ 1 ∗ 1 .  (18) 
 
In order to sign the expression on the RHS of equation (18), we need to first sign the derivative .⁄  To do so, we differentiate equation (12), keeping in mind the dependence of ∗ on . 
This gives us 
 
∗ 0      (19) 
 
and the sign of the expression on the RHS of equation (19) follows from the fact that ∗ is a 
decreasing function of .  
 Let us now use the result in equation (19) to ascertain the sign of the derivative in equation 
(18). After several algebraic steps, we infer that the well-being of voters in our city might increase 




∗ ∗      (20) 
 
holds. A careful review shows that the RHS of the inequality in (20) is increasing in the probability . Therefore, the likelihood that the condition in (20) will hold is higher when  is small. In turn, 
this last inference suggests that the condition in (20) will hold more often than not when 1  
is large and this means that the politician under consideration is more likely to be dishonest.  
 Why does this counterintuitive result hold? To answer this question, observe that in 
comparison with dishonest politicians, we generally expect honest politicians to make our city 
safer by raising the crime index to a higher value. All else being equal, this increased value of the 
crime index makes the residents of our city better off. However, in order to fund the increase in 
the size of the city police force that makes the city safer and hence voters better off, politicians 
need to raise tax revenues and this taxation influences the well-being of voters negatively.  
 Now remember that the marginal cost of public monies or  measures how hard it is for 
politicians to raise tax revenues. In our setting, when we allow dishonest politicians to appear 
honest, there is a range of values for  ∗  where dishonest politicians effectively appear 
to be honest. The interaction of this “range of values for ” with the magnitude of the probability 
 gives rise to scenarios in which the activities of dishonest politicians may raise the well-being 
of voters in our city. This completes our political-economy perspective on mayoral elections and 
urban crime.  
7. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we provided a political-economy analysis of crime prevention in an arbitrary 
city in the United States. City residents (voters) elected mayors (politicians) and elected mayors 
18 
 
determined the resources to be allocated to crime prevention. Between the two time periods, there 
was an election. Politicians were either honest or dishonest. The marginal cost of public monies  
measured how efficiently an elected mayor converted tax receipts into crime prevention. Voters 
had identical per period utility functions. We ascertained the equilibrium outcome and the per 
period well-being of the voters. Second, we showed that an increase in  reduced the equilibrium 
allocation of resources to crime prevention and voter well-being. Third, a dishonest politician could 
delay the revelation of his dishonesty. We showed that a critical value of , ∗, existed such that 
the dishonest incumbent separated and lost the election if and only if ∗ and that he pooled 
and was re-elected otherwise. Finally, we noted that an increase in  could raise voter well-being 
when politicians were more likely to be dishonest.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are 
three potential extensions. First, it would be useful to distinguish between different kinds of 
criminal activity in a city and to then see what impact different kinds of crime reducing activities 
undertaken by the police in one time period have on the electability of mayors and on the well-
being of residents in subsequent time periods. Second, it would be helpful to study criminal activity 
in a set of cities where the actions of a “tough-on-crime” mayor in one city drives criminals to 
othere cities and hence gives rise to crime related spatial spillovers. Finally, one could analyze 
how the notion of stability, proposed by Greenberg et al. (2002), affects the modeling environment 
examined in this paper. Studies of crime prevention in cities that incorporate these aspects of the 
problem into the analysis will provide further insights into how the interactions between politicians 
(mayors) and voters (residents) can lead to lower crime and hence to higher well-being for all the 
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